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What's New

This page mirrors CHANGELOG.md in the main Pharlux repo. The repo file is the source of truth; this page is regenerated when a new version ships. Format follows Keep a Changelog and Semantic Versioning.

Unreleased​

Security​

  • Bumped tar from 0.4.44 to 0.4.45 to address RUSTSEC-2026-0067 (unpack_in symlink chmod escape, medium 5.1) and RUSTSEC-2026-0068 (PAX size header inconsistency, medium 5.1). Used by the pharlux backup subcommand. Commit 515fef3.
  • Bumped rustls-webpki (transitive via rustls 0.23 → reqwest) from 0.103.11 to 0.103.13 to address RUSTSEC-2026-0098 (URI-name constraint bypass), RUSTSEC-2026-0099 (wildcard-name constraint bypass), and RUSTSEC-2026-0104 (reachable panic in CRL parsing). Commit 515fef3.
  • Bumped rand from 0.9.1 to 0.9.4 (workspace direct pin) and 0.8.5 to 0.8.6 (transitive via num-bigint-dig → rsa → jsonwebtoken) to address RUSTSEC-2026-0097 (unsoundness with custom logger using rand::rng()). Not reachable in Pharlux's build (we use tracing, not a custom log logger), but the patch is taken on principle. Commit 64162be.
  • Documented one remaining unfixable advisory with reachability justification: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (rsa 0.9.10 Marvin attack). Pharlux uses jsonwebtoken with HS256 only, so the RSA decryption code paths the Marvin attack targets are unreachable in our binary. No upstream fix is available. Documented in deny.toml [advisories.ignore] with re-evaluation steps if RS256/RS384/RS512 support is added in future. Commit 20c0ed5.

Added​

  • New deny.toml project policy file for cargo deny check. Encodes the SPDX license allow-list (covering every license observed in the resolved dependency tree as of 2026-05-03), the no-OpenSSL family TLS policy as a hard [bans] deny rule, the per-advisory ignore list with written justifications, and crates.io as the only allowed source registry. Commit 2de8eb4.

1.0.0 — 2026-04-17​

First public release. V1 feature-complete. All Phase 0, 1, 2, and 3 exit gates passed.

Version 1.0.0 signals a commitment to semver on the public API surface: the REST endpoints, the pharlux.toml config schema, the OTLP ingest subset, the Parquet on-disk schemas, and the WAL record framing. Breaking changes to any of these require a 2.0.0 bump.

Added​

Storage​

  • Production WAL (prost + CRC32 + length prefix, ADR-0018) with segment rotation and tenant-aware replay
  • Parquet writer with per-signal, per-tenant, hourly partitioning
  • Per-tenant retention, manual compaction with crash-safe marker protocol
  • WAL + Parquet union TableProvider for DataFusion (RwLock snapshot design)

Ingestion​

  • OTLP gRPC (port 4317): MetricsService + LogsService
  • OTLP HTTP/protobuf (port 4318): /v1/metrics + /v1/logs
  • Backpressure: bounded mpsc channel, HTTP 429 / gRPC RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED
  • Timestamp validation, metric name validation, attribute length caps, 2 MB body limit
  • TenantResolver trait for API-key-to-tenant mapping

Query​

  • DataFusion QueryEngine with logical-plan tenant filter on every TableScan
  • Per-request SessionContext, 256 MB MemoryPool cap (ADR-0011)

Auth​

  • JWT (HS256) with required exp claim, Argon2id (OWASP 2023: 19 MiB)
  • SQLite user/API key tables, tenant-scoped operations

API​

  • REST: /health, /query, /auth/login, /metrics, /admin/tenants (CRUD)
  • Prometheus exposition at GET /metrics with live atomic counters

Alerting​

  • SQL-based rules in SQLite, state machine (OK/PENDING/FIRING/RESOLVED)
  • Circuit breaker: 3 consecutive panics → self-disable (Decision 16)

Frontend​

  • React 18 + TypeScript + Vite, embedded via rust-embed
  • Login, SQL editor (CodeMirror 6), Dashboard (ECharts: metrics bar, log severity pie, recent logs)

CLI​

  • Subcommands: compact, backup, install, migrate, version
  • Single-binary deployment (Axum + Tonic on shared Tokio runtime, ADR-0004)

Documentation​

  • Getting started, OTLP config reference, SQL query reference
  • Logs query performance (10 GB/day LIKE threshold), reverse proxy (Caddy/nginx), backup/restore

Performance​

  • 577k pts/sec sustained 30s, 0 errors, 7 ms avg latency (4 vCPU / 8 GB)
  • 81 MB statically-linked musl binary

Testing​

  • 149 tests, crash recovery 10/10, e2e integration test, cross-signal JOIN
  • clippy clean, fmt clean

Security​

  • Outbound HTTP TLS backend is rustls (no OpenSSL in the dep tree). Applies to webhook and Slack alert notifications and the load-test client. Enables a genuinely OpenSSL-free musl static-pie binary.